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Abstract
Do people blame refugees for negative events? We propose a novel experimental
paradigm to measure discrimination in responsibility attribution towards Arabic
refugees. Participants in the laboratory experience a positive or negative income
shock, which is with equal probability caused by a random draw or another
participant’s performance in a real effort task. Responsibility attribution is
measured by beliefs about whether the shock is due to the other participant’s
performance or the random draw. We find evidence for reverse discrimination:
Natives attribute responsibility more favorably to refugees than to other natives.
In particular, refugees are less often held responsible for negative income
shocks. Moreover, natives with negative implicit associations towards Arabic
names attribute responsibility less favorably to refugees than natives with
positive associations. Since neither actual performance differences nor beliefs
about natives’ and refugees’ performance can explain our finding of reverse
discrimination, we rule out statistical discrimination as the driving force. We
discuss explanations based on theories of self-image and identity concerns.
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“You know what a disaster this massive immigration has been to Germany and the people of
Germany — crime has risen to levels that no one thought they would ever see.”
U.S. president Donald Trump on refugees in Germany1
1 Introduction
Europe experienced a large inflow of refugees in 2015. As a consequence, a heated
debate about whether to tolerate large refugee inflows or whether to instead close
borders arose in both the U.S. and Europe. As reflected by the quote of U.S. president
Donald Trump at the beginning of the paper, this discussion focuses to a large
extent on whether refugees are responsible for negative outcomes such as rising
crime rates, adverse aggregate employment, or poor economic development. Some
suggest such responsibility, while others argue against it and accuse their opponents
of xenophobic attitudes.2 Despite the relevance of discrimination against refugees
for social and economic outcomes, surprisingly little is known about whether natives
indeed blame refugees for undesired events, and if so, whether this is caused by
statistical discrimination.
We address these questions by implementing a laboratory experiment with
refugees who are placed in Munich, Germany. German participants are randomly
paired either with another German or a refugee. This allows us to provide clean
evidence on differences in responsibility attribution and to shed light on mechanisms
of discrimination in this context. More precisely, our subjects receive a positive
or a negative income shock. This shock is either due to a random draw or the
partner’s performance in a real effort task, which took place before the main part of
the experiment. If the partner actually is responsible for the shock — unbeknownst to
the participant — and his performance was high enough to pass a certain threshold, a
positive income shock occurs. In contrast, low performance implies a negative shock
1https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/16/trump-says-german-
crime-levels-have-risen-and-refugees-are-to-blame-not-exactly (last accessed on March 8,
2018).
2Besides the article in The Washington Post referred to in footnote 1, see https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/12/09/world/europe/refugees-arrest-turns-a-crime-into-national-news-and-
debate-in-germany.html (last accessed on March 8, 2018).
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when the partner is responsible. After displaying the individual income shocks to the
participants, we elicit beliefs about responsibility, i.e., whether the matched partner
or the random draw was responsible — our core outcome measure. To investigate
whether our results are driven by statistical discrimination, we further elicit beliefs
about the partner’s performance.3
This setup closely relates to many situations in which responsibility has to be
assigned while there is uncertainty with respect to the actual cause. Consider, for
example, employee evaluations. Increasing or decreasing sales can arise directly
from the performance of an employee or be due to general shifts in demand. Layoff
or promotion as well as bonus and raise decisions will crucially depend on the
supervisor’s assessment of this responsibility. However, responsibility attribution is
not only essential for an individual’s success once in a certain position, it can also
critically affect the chances of being hired in the first place. The interpretation of a
vita’s quality signals — for example whether good performance evaluations refer to the
individual’s performance or merely to lenient HR policies — but also the assessment
of late arrivals to interviews or sickness strongly affect hiring decisions. For all good
and bad outcomes, many explanations for responsibility of either the candidate or
“nature” are possible. Differing attribution behavior for refugees compared to natives
can consequently have a major impact on refugees’ labor market integration efforts.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate such discrimination in
responsibility attribution, do so by inviting refugees — a highly relevant group for
that matter — to the laboratory and implement a new experimental paradigm.
We do not observe discrimination against the outgroup of refugees by blaming
them for negative outcomes. Quite the contrary can be inferred from our data.
Refugees are treated more favorably than Germans. They are held responsible
relatively more often for positive and less often for negative shocks. Actual
performance differences and beliefs about the performance of Germans and refugees
3In the literature, the term statistical discrimination is most often used for discrimination based on
actual differences in characteristics or behavior between different groups (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy,
2001). Since our subjects have no information about average performances of Germans and refugees,
we instead refer to discrimination based on (potentially inaccurate) beliefs about different performances
as statistical discrimination.
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cannot explain this difference. Hence, statistical discrimination does not explain
our result of reverse discrimination. Furthermore, we measure implicit associations
towards Arabic names and show that, despite our finding of reverse discrimination,
Germans on average have negative implicit associations towards Arabic names.
Indicating a positive relationship between implicit attitudes and explicit attribution
behavior, subjects with positive implicit associations favor refugees more than subjects
with negative associations. In addition, we do not find any evidence for reverse
discrimination in a second experiment, in which we assign Germans to artificial in-
and outgroups. This shows that our findings from the first experiment are driven by
our natural outgroup of refugees and are not a result of our experimental design per
se.
Discrimination affects a wide range of social and economic outcomes and comes
in many forms and domains. For instance, discrimination can result in disadvantages
for education and health related outcomes (e.g., Heckman, 1998; Shapiro et al., 2013;
Krieger, 2014) as well as in obstacles to participate in the labor market (e.g., Goldin
and Rouse, 2000; Carneiro et al., 2005; Lang and Manove, 2011). Our paper abstracts
from these different domains and sheds light on a specific form of discrimination
that has not been studied yet — responsibility attribution. Our design also allows
us to distinguish between statistical and other types of discrimination and hence
to talk about the channels for discriminatory behavior. Other experimental papers
have specifically looked at a variety of underlying mechanisms, too.4 Fershtman
and Gneezy (2001) investigate trust and social preferences of ingroup and outgroup
members in the Israeli society. Using the investment, dictator, and ultimatum
game, they find clear stereotypes associated with different ethnic groups leading
to discriminatory behavior. Ockenfels and Werner (2014) provide related evidence
on ingroup favoritism. They show that people share more of their endowment
in a dictator game when paired with an ingroup member, which indicates an
explanation based on social preferences. Similarly, Chen and Li (2009) report increased
altruism towards ingroup members in allocation games for different measures of social
4For a meta-study on economic experiments on discrimination, see Lane (2016).
3
preferences, e.g., punishment for misbehavior. In stark contrast to these papers,
we do not observe ingroup favoritism or discrimination “against” the outgroup but
document reverse discrimination.
We also contribute more generally to the understanding of how responsibility is
attributed per se. Bartling and Fischbacher (2011) and Bartling et al. (2015) show that
responsibility can be effectively shifted through the delegation of choice and not being
pivotal. This evidence indicates that responsibility attribution is malleable and that
there is scope for discrimination in attribution behavior.
The much more extensive literature on responsibility attribution in psychology
focuses on whether individuals attribute explicit behaviors to internal characteristics
or situational factors. Ross (1977) coined the term “fundamental attribution error”,
which presumes the tendency to underestimate the role of external circumstances
when judging others’ behavior. Jones and Harris (1967), the original paper to address
this issue, investigate subjects’ assessments of a writer’s private opinion of Fidel
Castro. Although subjects know that the writer was randomly told to either praise
or criticize Castro in an essay, they rated the writer’s opinion as more favorable
towards Castro when he had written a pro-Castro text. Hence, subjects wrongfully
attributed responsibility for the content of the text to the writer. Pettigrew (1979)
relates this bias to ingroup favoritism and hence discriminatory behavior calling it
“ultimate attribution error”. Negative actions by an outgroup member will more likely
be attributed to personal causes, whereas positive actions are more likely attributed to
external factors (e.g., luck or “the exceptional case”) compared to actions by an ingroup
member (for an extensive review see Hewstone, 1990). In contrast to this literature,
we do not study whether internal or external factors cause individual behavior. This
would correspond, for example, to attributing responsibility for an employee’s explicit
action. That is, the supervisor knows that the sales manager hired an excellent sales rep
but can either attribute this to excellent knowledge of human nature or to mere luck.
Instead, we investigate whether an event where the true underlying cause is unknown
— who hired the sales rep — is attributed to an individual or something else — the
specific sales manager or someone else.
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As our subjects are willing to sacrifice part of their payoffs in order not to
blame refugees, our finding is not compatible with the standard economic model
of purely self-interested agents. Instead, we interpret our results as being in line
with theories of economics of identity and motivated beliefs. In such a framework,
people care about a positive self-image or generally want to behave according to
certain prescriptions pertaining to their identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). These
concerns can affect behavior and may lead to self-serving beliefs over behavior of other
people (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2015). For our context, it is important that being open
and tolerant towards minorities and refugees is part of the social identity of many
people, presumably especially in our student sample. Hence, identity concerns might
motivate our participants to attribute responsibility more positively towards refugees
since blaming refugees is clearly associated with xenophobic attitudes.5 We also favor
this interpretation because in our anonymous laboratory setting, we rule out social
image concerns as much as possible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the experimental design in detail. Section 3 presents our results on responsibility
attribution. Section 4 is about a robustness experiment that we ran with artificially
formed groups. Section 5 discusses our main finding and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Procedures and Design
2.1 Procedural Details
We programmed and conducted the experiment with “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007).
Germans, 152 students from various fields of study, were recruited using the online
recruiting system “ORSEE” (Greiner, 2015). Additionally, 43 refugees were recruited
in Munich with leaflets at refugees camps, in front of local registration offices, and in
cooperation with the NGO Social Impact Recruiting (SIR).6 Figure A.1 in the Appendix
5For instance, see http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/justin-welby-is-wrong-it-is-
racist-to-blame-migrants-for-your-fears-about-jobs-and-wages-a6925106.html (last accessed
on March 8, 2018).
6SIR supports refugees in finding a job by creating a German CV, preparing for interviews, and
contacting employers. For further information see http://si-recruiting.org/ (last accessed on
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shows an English version of the leaflet.
Because the vast majority of SIR clients and most of the refugees arriving
in Germany were male, we decided to restrict the sample to male refugees.7
Consequently, we also invited only male Germans to have single sex pairs in both
ingroups and outgroups such that we did not have to control for potential gender
effects. In addition, we wanted our refugee subjects to be of roughly the same age
as our other participants. Hence, only refugees between the age of 18 and 29 were
invited to participate in the experiment. To have a relatively homogeneous outgroup
that represents the majority of refugees in Germany, we only invited Arabic native
speakers.8 To also have a homogeneous ingroup, we only invited native participants
with a German sounding name. This ensured that participants assigned to an ingroup
member indeed regarded the matched participant as ingroup member.9
All 10 experimental sessions took place at the Munich Experimental Laboratory
for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich from August
to November 2016. The assignment to the seats in the laboratory made clear that there
were two different groups in the experiment. Refugees had to draw a card with a
seat number from a bag with the label “Arabic” (in Arabic letters) and Germans from
a bag with the label “German” (in German). The cards ensured that the participants
were seated in front of a computer screen with instructions in the respective language.
Within each group, subjects were randomly assigned to a seat. An English version of
the instructions is included in Appendix E. Refugees were invited to the experiment
half an hour earlier than Germans to make sure they knew what to expect and to
check reading and writing proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic.10 Announcements
March 8, 2018).
7See page 21 of the German report of the German Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees: http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Broschueren/bundesamt-
in-zahlen-2015.html (last accessed on March 8, 2018).
8German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/
EN/Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2015-zentrale-ergebnisse (last
accessed on March 8, 2018).
9All refugees indeed had Arabic names. See Section A in the Appendix for a complete list of first
names of all participants. At the time of writing this paper, only roughly 3% of our regular subjects
registered for experiments at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences
(MELESSA) had Arabic sounding names. It therefore should have been clear to our German participants
that they were matched with a refugee when their partner’s name was Arabic sounding.
10Some refugees could not participate in the experiment since they indicated that they were not
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before and during the experiment were repeated in Arabic by two student research
assistants. If necessary, they answered questions by the refugees individually at the
subjects’ seats. Questions of Germans were answered by the experimenter.
For the main part of the experiment, we formed ingroup and outgroup pairs. As
we do not focus on how refugees attribute responsibility, we denote Germans matched
with another German as belonging to the German treatment (ingroup) and Germans
matched with a refugee as belonging to the Refugee treatment (outgroup). In order to
increase the number of decisions taken by Germans, we matched each refugee with up
to two Germans. Group assignment of Germans was random conditional on assigning
the same number of Germans to the treatments German and Refugee.11 At the beginning
of the main part of the experiment, subjects needed to enter their first name, which was
then shown to their matched partner and enabled all subjects to identify their partner’s
group affiliation.12
At the end of the experiment, the participants answered a questionnaire about
socio-demographic characteristics. Thereafter, all subjects were paid privately and
earnede12.3 on average, including a fixed payment ofe6 for showing up on time. The
sessions lasted between 60 and 75 minutes. Each subject participated in one session
only.
2.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, subjects received a flat fee
of e3 for performing a real effort task. They solved up to eight simple (6×4) jigsaw
puzzles (henceforth puzzles) within ten minutes. The puzzles were placed next to the
keyboard and were covered by a sheet of paper at every seat. Subjects were asked not
to touch the stack until the experimenter had indicated to begin. We chose puzzle
sufficiently able to read and spell.
11Only even numbers of German subjects participated in the sessions. If dividing the number of
German subjects into two groups of equal size resulted in an odd number, groups were formed such
that there were two more Germans matched with a refugee than with another German. For instance, in
a session with 18 Germans, 10 of them were matched with a refugee.
12Loss of anonymity is not a concern despite identification via names. In the questionnaire at the end
of the experiment, only 6% of German participants indicated that they knew another participant in their
session. There are on average more than 15 German participants per session. Hence, their likelihood of
being matched to someone known is smaller than 1%.
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motives to be culturally neutral (see Figure B.1 in the Appendix). This real effort
task has the advantage of being familiar to participants from different parts of the
world. We could not use a computer-based task because many of the refugees were
not familiar with working with a personal computer.13 Furthermore, many Germans
arguably would have expected a large performance difference between refugees and
Germans. Importantly, at the time of solving the puzzles, participants knew nothing
about the content of the rest of the experiment. At the end of part one, the experimenter
and student research assistants quietly counted the number of correctly solved puzzles
at the subjects’ seats.
For the second and main part of the experiment, subjects were randomly paired
with another participant in the experiment into ingroup (both subjects Germans) and
outgroup pairs (one German and refugee each). The decision task of the second part
of the experiment is illustrated in Figure 1. Player A faced a positive or negative
income shock. He either received e5 or e5 were subtracted from his experimental
earnings.14 However, player A did not know how this shock came about. With an
ex-ante probability of 50%, this shock was due to the performance of player B (the
matched participant) and otherwise due to nature. If player B’s performance was
responsible for the income shock, the shock was positive if player B’s number of
correctly solved puzzles was at least four and negative otherwise. In the case of nature
being responsible for the income shock, one of the two shocks was randomly chosen
with equal probability. Furthermore, player B’s payoff was not affected by whether
player A received a positive or negative shock.
The decision task was performed symmetrically within each pair, i.e., every
subject was player A and player B. Subjects were fully aware of the task setup. All
participants had to answer four control questions correctly before starting the main
part of the experiment to make sure they fully understood the decision tree.
Subsequently, in the first belief elicitation, subjects guessed whether nature or
player B’s performance caused the income shock and received e5 if their guess was
13In the first three sessions, we asked refugees whether they are familiar with puzzles before the start
of the experiment. All of them confirmed.















Figure 1: Decision tree
correct. This allows us to identify differences in responsibility attribution to Germans
and refugees and is our main variable of interest. In order to get a more precise
measure of responsibility attribution, we additionally asked for the player’s confidence
in their own guess in a second belief elicitation. More specifically, participants filled
out a 9-item choice list with two options (A and B) for each of the nine choices (based
on Becker et al., 1964, henceforth BDM). If they chose option A and the respective
choice became payoff relevant, they received e5 if their chosen mechanism (in the first
belief elicitation) was indeed responsible for the shock (player B or nature). Option A
was the same for all nine choices. Option B gave them the chance to receive e5 with
probabilities ranging from 10% to 90% in 10% increments. If a participant, for example,
expected player B to be responsible in the first elicitation and switched to option B in
row seven, he assigned between 60% and 70% probability to the event that player B
indeed was responsible.
In addition, we elicited binary beliefs about performance to see whether potential
differences in responsibility attribution stem from statistical discrimination. We asked
whether subjects believed that the matched player’s performance passed the threshold
of four solved puzzles or not (again incentivized with e5). Finally, we asked for the
probability player A assigned to the matched participant having solved at least four
puzzles. Again, subjects faced a (BDM-based) choice list with nine choices between
option A, i.e., receiving e5 if the partner’s performance was at or above the cutoff, and
















































































































































Figure 2: Timeline of the experiment
in total, we elicited four incentivized beliefs. At the end of the experiment, in order to
prevent hedging, one of these belief questions was randomly chosen for payment and
either paid e5 or nothing.
The order of the four belief elicitations, however, was not the same in all sessions.
In half of the sessions, we elicited performance beliefs before explaining the structure
of the decision task. Hence, in these sessions (henceforth Uncond), participants first
worked on the puzzles, were then matched with a partner and directly asked for
the two (unconditional) performance beliefs regarding the partner (binary choice and
choice list). Only then the decision task was explained and the shock realized. In the
other half of the sessions (henceforth Cond), (conditional) performance beliefs were
elicited after the task had been explained, the shock had realized, and after subjects
had attributed responsibility. This allows us — by comparing performance beliefs in
the treatments Uncond and Cond — to examine whether subjects formed distorted or
motivated beliefs after observing the shock and attributing responsibility. For instance,
assume that a subject attributes responsibility to the partner after observing a negative
shock. If this subject is asked about his performance belief, he could justify his
attribution behavior by stating low performance beliefs, although he actually thinks
that the partner passed the cutoff. Hence, we had a 2×2 treatment design along the
dimensions group assignment and task order. Figure 2 provides an overview of task
orders in the respective treatments.
After these two main parts of the experiment, participants performed the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit associations towards Arabic names. Subjects
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had to assign positive (e.g., “appealing”, “love”, “cheer”) or negative expressions
(e.g., “selfish”, “dirty”, “bothersome”) to Arabic or Caucasian names by pressing keys
on their keyboard. The IAT score, which indicates positive or negative associations
towards Arabic names, is calculated based on response times to sort names to
expressions. If a subject needed more time to assign positive expressions and less to
assign negative expressions to Arabic compared to Caucasian names, the IAT score is
below zero indicating negative implicit attitudes towards Arabic names. This task has
been shown to relate to various dimensions of field behavior such as job recruitment
(see Greenwald et al. (2009) for a meta study). We used FreeIAT, a free software to run
IATs.15 Subjects were paid e2 for completing the IAT.
3 Results
Our main results on the comparison of responsibility attribution by group assignment
over all sessions combined are reported in Section 3.1. This abstracts from potential
systematic differences between Uncond and Cond, which we analyze in 3.2 separately.
Section 3.3 presents evidence for heterogeneity using scores from the Implicit
Association Test. Section 3.4 reports results using the BDM-based probability measures
of our main outcome variable and performance beliefs. Unless stated otherwise, all our
results in this section consider attribution behavior of our German participants only.
3.1 Favorable Responsibility Attribution
Since we test whether our subjects assign responsibility less, equally or more favorably
to Germans or refugees, i.e., whether there is discrimination in attribution behavior,
we define the binary variable favorable attribution. We denote responsibility attribution
as favorable if a positive shock occurs and the matched partner is believed to
be responsible for the shock. Attribution is also favorable if a negative shock is
observed and responsibility is assigned to nature. In contrast, attributing responsibility
to the matched partner after a negative shock or to nature after a positive shock



























Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution for both treatments. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 3: Favorable attribution depending on group affiliation
implies unfavorable attribution.16 This simplification ignores potential asymmetries
in behavior after positive versus negative income shocks. We will show later that our
results hold for both shock directions.
Figure 3 displays favorable attribution by group affiliation. Germans matched
with another German (n = 72) equally often attribute responsibility favorably and
unfavorably. In stark contrast to that, Germans matched with a refugee (n = 80)
attribute responsibility favorably in roughly two thirds of the cases. This difference
in attribution behavior is statistically significant (p = 0.042, χ2-test, two-sided) and
evidence for reverse discrimination, i.e., a positive bias towards the refugee outgroup.
Under rationality, favorable attribution represents the belief about the matched
partner having solved at least four puzzles. Hence, the results displayed in Figure 3
could be driven by performance beliefs depending on group affiliation. We would
expect more favorable attribution in Refugee if subjects believed that refugees are better
than Germans in solving puzzles. However, comparing performance beliefs reveals no
16The intuition underlying this distinction is rational behavior depending on beliefs. Nature and the
matched partner are ex-ante responsible with equal probability. Given nature is responsible, positive
and negative shocks occur with equal probability. Hence, if the decision maker expects the matched
partner to having solved four or more puzzles and thus assigns a probability larger than 50% to
this event, he should attribute responsibility favorably. Therefore, under the assumption of rational
behavior, favorable attribution captures underlying beliefs about the partner reaching the puzzle cutoff.
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significant difference. If anything, Germans expect refugees to perform slightly worse,
which renders reverse discrimination even more pronounced. While 43% of Germans
matched with a refugee expect the refugee to have solved at least four puzzles,
51% of Germans matched with another German have high performance beliefs (p =
0.273, χ2-test, two-sided).17 This indicates that the asymmetry in responsibility
attribution cannot be rationally based on performance beliefs. In Figure 4, we compare
actual favorable responsibility attribution (favorable attribution) and rational favorable
responsibility attribution (rational attribution). We define rational attribution to be one
if the German participant has high performance beliefs regarding the matched partner
and zero otherwise. Figure 4 shows that while actual responsibility attribution is on
average in line with performance beliefs for Germans matched with another German,
attribution is clearly more favorable than dictated by performance beliefs for Germans
matched with refugees.18 The difference in Refugee is significant (p < 0.01, McNemar
test, two-sided).19
Next, we control for the direction of the income shock. Since the actual
performance of refugees was much worse than that of Germans, Germans in Refugee
observe negative shocks much more often. Hence, more favorable attribution after
negative shocks, independent of group affiliation, could explain our results. However,
the shock direction does not drive our finding. For both negative and positive shocks,
there is a clear asymmetry by group affiliation in terms of how performance beliefs
translate into responsibility attribution (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix). Importantly,
there is no evidence for blaming the refugees in case of negative shocks. We observe the
contrary. Refugees are attributed responsibility much more favorably after a negative
17With our sample size, we have 80% power to detect an effect size that implies a belief difference of
around 22 percentage points. Actual performance differences are much more pronounced. While 47% of
the Germans solve four or more puzzles, only 2.3% of the refugees (1 out of 43) reached the performance
cutoff. Therefore, statistical discrimination based on actual behavior would imply much more favorable
attribution to Germans and thus can neither explain our results.
18We cannot analyze refugee behavior by group affiliation since refugees are only matched with
Germans. While this is not the interest of this paper and we do not have adequate power to detect
patterns, 51.2% attribute responsibility favorably, whereas only 9.3% of them believe that their partner
made the performance cutoff.
19These findings are robust to comparing attribution behavior with the individual’s own
performance. While own performance need not necessarily be a perfect proxy for beliefs regarding
the performance of the other, performance is certainly orthogonal to treatment — unlike beliefs that
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Favorable attribution
Rational attribution
Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution and rational attribution implied by beliefs for both
treatments. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4: Favorable attribution and rational attribution implied by beliefs
shock compared to rational attribution based on performance beliefs (p < 0.01,
McNemar test, two-sided).
To verify the robustness of our non-parametric results, we run different
regression models. The regression framework helps us to further understand
attribution behavior by explicitly measuring the effects of beliefs and shock direction
on favorable attribution while being able to control for observables, too. Table 1 reports
marginal effects from probit regressions on our binary variable favorable attribution.
Column (1) is the parametric equivalent to Figure 3 replicating the significant
positive effect of being matched with a refugee on favorable attribution. This is indicated
by the binary variable Refugee, which is equal to one if a subject is matched with
a refugee and zero otherwise. Column (2), equivalent to Figure 4, controls for
performance beliefs with belief high as binary variable. Belief high is equal to one if
a subject believes that the partner passed the cutoff and zero otherwise. The effect
of group affiliation remains highly significant and sizable. Being matched with a
refugee increases the likelihood to attribute responsibility favorably by 19.5 percentage
points. The effect in model (2) is slightly larger than in model (1), which is in line with
our non-parametric results. As performance beliefs are slightly worse for refugees,
controlling for beliefs increases the effect of group affiliation. Reassuringly, high
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Table 1: Favorable responsibility attribution
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee 0.160*** 0.195*** 0.155*** 0.146***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.040) (0.038)
Belief high 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.375***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.068)
Neg shock 0.164** 0.158**
(0.064) (0.064)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 152 152 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.149 0.172 0.179
Notes: Probit regressions on favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects. Column (4) includes
additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of experiments so far (all
insignificant). Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
performance beliefs lead to more favorable responsibility attribution. Subjects who
believe that the partner passed the cutoff are 37.2 percentage points more likely to
exhibit favorable attribution. As motivated above, we include the shock direction in
column (3) with neg shock as binary variable. It is equal to one if a negative shock occurs
and zero otherwise. We find a significant positive effect of negative shocks indicating
that participants attribute responsibility generally more favorably after a negative
shock. However, this does not alter our finding regarding group affiliation. Finally,
our results are robust to controlling for personal background variables in column (4).
Result 1: Germans attribute responsibility more favorably to refugees than to other German
participants. This cannot be explained by differing performance beliefs and holds for behavior
after both negative and positive shocks.
3.2 Unconditional vs. Conditional Beliefs
Participants in our Cond treatment were asked to state their performance beliefs after
observing the shock and after attributing responsibility. Hence, in order to justify
attribution in front of themselves, participants may report distorted beliefs. To quantify
this potential distortion, we ran half of the sessions with performance beliefs elicited











































Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution, rational attribution, and the fraction of participants
reaching the puzzle cutoff (own performance) by group affiliation for the treatments Cond (left
panel) and Uncond (right panel). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5: Favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance
To investigate whether performance beliefs are distorted, we relate these beliefs
to own performance — measured by whether the individual solved at least four puzzles.
Own performance serves as a benchmark for beliefs regarding others’ performances and
hence should be the main driver for performance beliefs. This hypothesis is supported
by our data. In German, 50% pass the puzzle cutoff and 51% expect the matched partner
to having done so. In Refugee, 45% of Germans solve at least four puzzles and 43%
expect that from the matched partner. Only roughly one fourth of our subjects, both in
German and Refugee, does not believe the matched participant to have performed in the
same way as they did. Figure 5 displays average own performance, beliefs in the other’s
performance (i.e., rational attribution), and actual responsibility attribution (favorable
attribution) by group affiliation and task ordering (Uncond vs. Cond) separately.20
Performance beliefs cannot be distorted by knowledge about our responsibility
attribution task in Uncond. In this case, displayed in the right panel of Figure 5,
20This reveals that randomization was not successful with regard to puzzle performance. A
significantly larger fraction of subjects in Uncond pass the performance cutoff than subjects in Cond
(p < 0.01, χ2-test, two-sided). Table C.1 in the Appendix shows the sample balance.
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Germans expect other Germans on average to perform slightly better than themselves
and refugees to be slightly worse. Compared to that, performance beliefs seem
distorted in Cond. Beliefs of ingroup members are slightly lower than own performance,
while they are higher for Germans in Refugee. On average, Germans matched with a
refugee in Uncond are 7.5 percentage points less likely to believe in the performance
of their partner compared to their own performance. However, German outgroup
participants in Cond are 2.5 percentage points more likely to believe in the performance
of the refugee than in their own. Hence, the difference in the differences between own
performance and performance beliefs over the two treatments for subjects in Refugee
is 0.1. This corresponds to a positive belief distortion in favor of refugees once
knowing the decision task. Performing the same difference in differences calculation
for subjects in German, we find a difference in differences of 0.14 that shows worse
performance beliefs in Cond (negative distortion against other Germans). While this 24
percentage points difference in distortion between German and Refugee is considerate,
it is insignificant (p = 0.151, t-test, two-sided).21
Hence, under the assumption of unbiased beliefs in Uncond our findings from
Section 3.1 provide a lower bound for the extent of reverse discrimination. The results
from this section indicate that true underlying beliefs in Cond could actually be worse
for refugees and better for other Germans than stated in the belief elicitation. This
would increase the asymmetry between rational and actual responsibility attribution
beyond what we measure in Section 3.1.
Result 2: We find no significant evidence for subjects stating distorted beliefs. However,
if anything, the results point towards favorably distorted beliefs with respect to refugees,
suggesting that the results from the pooled sample (Section 3.1) constitute a lower bound for
reverse discrimination.
The assumption in this section is that beliefs in Uncond are unbiased. This seems
reasonable since participants are unaware of the rest of the experiment in this treatment
21This calculation is equivalent to regressing the individual difference between rational attribution
(performance beliefs) and own performance in an OLS estimation on Refugee, Cond, and their interaction
term Refugee×Cond. The interaction term shows the 24 percentage points distortion for Germans
matched to refugees once they know the decision task.
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when stating their guess about their partner’s performance. However, unconditional
performance beliefs regarding refugees could already be distorted upwards such that
true underlying performance beliefs would actually be lower. If this was the case, our
overall finding of reverse discrimination would again be a lower bound of the true
discrimination. Given true performance beliefs, the difference between these beliefs
and responsibility attribution would be larger than the one we find with stated beliefs.
In contrast to that, performance beliefs could also be biased downwards and explain
our result of reverse discrimination. This, however, seems very unlikely because it
would imply discrimination at the level of performance beliefs — by stating lower
than actual beliefs about performance for refugees — and, to the contrary, reverse
discrimination at the level of responsibility attribution. Furthermore, it is implausible
that participants have such extremely inaccurate beliefs given that refugees actually
perform very poorly in the real effort task.
To account for the possibility of biased performance beliefs, we substitute these
beliefs by own performance to check the robustness of our main findings. Table C.2
in the Appendix reports results from regressions replicating Table 1 while using each
participant’s number of correctly solved puzzles as explanatory variable instead of his
performance beliefs.22 The results for Refugee from all models are strikingly similar to
the ones from Table 1, which renders our finding of reverse discrimination robust to
belief distortions.
3.3 Implicit Associations
The key personal characteristic that we elicit and correlate with attribution behavior
relates to implicit associations. The IAT measures people’s relative implicit associations
towards a specific group compared to a baseline group. In our case, it is a measure of
associations towards Arabic names relative to Caucasian names.23 A positive test score
22Alternatively, using a binary variable for whether the respective participant solved at least four
puzzles does not change the significance of the Refugee or neg shock indicators.
23Arabic names are Hakim, Sharif, Yousef, Wahib, Akbar, Muhsin, Salim, Karim, Habib, and Ashraf,
and Caucasian Names are Ernesto, Matthais, Maarten, Philippe, Guillame, Benoit, Takuya, Kazuki,
Chaiyo, and Marcelo. Positive associations are Excellent, Cheer, Delight, Joyous, Excitement, Cherish,
Friendship, and Beautiful, and negative associations are Hate, Pain, Gross, Failure, Rotten, Humiliate,
Sickening, and Horrible. The IAT for Arabic names can be taken online by visiting https://implicit.
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implies relatively positive associations towards Arabic names, while a negative score
indicates the opposite.
Overall, the results from the IAT are in line with ingroup favoritism. While
72% of Germans have a negative IAT and hence relatively more negative associations
towards Arabic names, this is the case for only 12% of the refugees (p < 0.01, χ2-test,
two-sided).24
Importantly, implicit attitudes have predictive power for explicit discrimination
behavior. People with negative IAT scores favor refugees less with regard to
responsibility attribution. 83% of Germans with a positive IAT in Refugee attribute
responsibility favorably, while only 59% with a negative IAT do so. This difference is
significant (p = 0.034, χ2-test, two-sided).
To test the correlation between implicit associations and favorable attribution when
holding other variables constant, we further apply a regression framework. We control
for own performance rather than for performance beliefs since beliefs might have been
distorted, and this potential distortion is likely to be related to the IAT score. For
instance, subjects who are in general favorable towards refugees are likely to have a
positive IAT score and possibly upwards biased beliefs about a refugee’s performance.
Table 2 reports probit regressions of favorable attribution on IATneg, which is equal
to one if the IAT score is negative (negative associations towards Arabic names) and
zero otherwise (positive associations towards Arabic names), and own performance.
Column (1) includes subjects in Refugee only. As indicated by our non-parametric
results discussed before, we observe a large and significant correlation between
having a negative IAT score and responsibility attribution for Germans matched with
refugees. Those that have negative implicit association towards Arabic names are
27.2 percentage points less likely to attribute responsibility favorably to their matched
Arabic partner. Column (2) shows that a negative IAT score has no effect on favorable
responsibility attribution in German.25 Column (3) reports regression results for the
harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html and selecting “Arab-Muslim IAT”.
24The same holds true for average values. The average IAT score for Germans is −0.199, while the
average for refugees is 0.215. This difference is again highly significant (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test,
two-sided).
25Ex-ante, it is not obvious why the effect of implicit associations should be stronger in Refugee
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entire sample with additional controls and an interaction of the IAT score and our
treatment. These results confirm our findings from column (1) and (2). The marginal
effect of the interaction term of –0.343 indicates that a negative IAT value has a
more negative effect on favorable attribution for participants in Refugee compared to
participants in German. Further, replicating columns (1) and (2), we see that IAT scores
(IATneg) do not affect favorable attribution in German. In contrast, having a negative IAT
score decreases the likelihood to attribute responsibility favorably by 25.9 percentage
points in Refugee (p = 0.030, F-Test for IATneg + IATneg x Refugee).26 In addition, the
coefficient of Refugee shows that our result of reverse discrimination is mainly driven
by participants with a positive IAT score since the treatment difference is insignificant
for subjects with a negative IAT score (p = 0.390, F-Test for Refugee + IATneg x Refugee).
However, in nonlinear models including interaction terms, interpreting the
marginal effect of the interaction term is flawed (Ai and Norton, 2003) and hypothesis
testing can be misleading (Greene, 2010). This is due to the fact that, in nonlinear
models, the marginal effect of the interaction term is not the same as the cross
derivative with respect to both interacted variables (the interaction effect). In order to
account for this problem, we compute the predicted values of favorable attribution split
up along two dimensions — having a positive or negative IAT score as well as being
in Refugee or German. We calculate the difference in differences of these four groups,
which reflects the interaction effect in models including interaction terms with two
binary variables. We find that the effect of a negative IAT score on favorable attribution
is 36.19 percentage points lower in Refugee than in German.27 Since this estimate is very
close to the marginal effect of our interaction term in column (3), –0.343, the mistake
compared to German. The effects in the two different groups should go into opposite directions, but
there is no apparent reason why positive implicit associations towards one’s ingroup should not lead to
more favorable attribution towards these ingroup members. We interpret this finding in the following
way. First, it is plausible that associations regarding the more salient outgroup determine the IAT scores.
In that case, the IAT score should not predict behavior towards the ingroup. Second, we used a standard
version of the IAT measuring associations towards Arabic names. This version uses a wide range of
Caucasian names in the baseline group. Hence, attitudes towards German participants might not be
perfectly captured by this IAT. This again supports the idea that our IAT scores predominantly represent
implicit associations towards Arabic names and not German names.
26All results from Table 2 are qualitatively unchanged if we use the continuous variable of the IAT
instead of the binary version. Only the F-Test for IAT + IAT x Refugee in the interaction model becomes
borderline insignificant (p = 0.143).
27Estimation of the difference in differences in predicted values can be found in Appendix D.
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Table 2: Favorable responsibility attribution depending on IAT
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
Refugee German pooled
(1) (2) (3)
IATneg −0.272** 0.089 0.084
(0.114) (0.159) (0.162)








Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 80 72 152
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.071 0.114
Notes: Probit regressions on favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects.
Column (1) and (2) include only the sample of outgroup and ingroup participants
respectively. Column (3) includes the entire sample and additional covariates from the
questionnaire: age, semester, and number of experiments so far (all insignificant). Robust
and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance
on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
induced by interpreting the marginal effect of the interaction term as interaction effect
is negligible in our estimation.
Result 3: Implicit associations directly relate to explicit behavior. Reverse discrimination is
mainly driven by subjects with positive implicit association towards Arabic names.
3.4 Alternative Measures of Responsibility Attribution and
Performance Belief
By using the binary measure of responsibility attribution and by enforcing a choice, we
treat more or less indifferent participants the same as those who have a clear opinion
about responsibility. In this section, we want to check whether these indifferent people
could be driving our results. For this purpose, we define two new variables called
(i) responsibility switchpoint and (ii) performance switchpoint based on the two BDM belief
elicitations. These variables indicate probabilistic confidence in (i) the partner being
responsible for a positive shock (conditional on observing a positive shock) or the
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Table 3: Contingency table for binary vs. BDM choices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Responsibility:
(1) Binary favorable: Switchpoint 0 2 0 3 21 31 18 11 2 1
(2) Binary unfavorable: Switchpoint 3 2 7 14 16 14 2 4 1 0
Performance:
(3) Binary positive: Switchpoint 0 0 0 3 10 14 23 12 7 2
(4) Binary negative: Switchpoint 3 5 12 21 22 11 2 2 3 0
partner not being responsible for a negative shock (conditional on a negative shock)
and (ii) the partner having solved four or more puzzles. A higher value of responsibility
switchpoint hence indicates a more favorable attribution. A higher value of performance
switchpoint indicates a higher confidence in the matched partner having solved four or
more puzzles. Both variables, corresponding to the nine-item choice list, are measured
in 10 percentage point steps. Thus, a switchpoint of one corresponds to assigning
0-10% probability to the event and a switchpoint of 10 corresponds to 90-100%.
The average of responsibility switchpoint by group affiliation highlights a clear
difference to the findings from the binary measure. With an average switchpoint of
5.65 and 5.56 in German and Refugee respectively, there is no difference in responsibility
attribution by group affiliation. Is this difference in response behavior driven by
outliers, by indifferent participants, or do we observe other inconsistencies? To
understand consistency between the binary and BDM belief elicitation, Table 3 displays
a contingency table for these choices reporting combinations of binary choices and
BDM choices. Row (1) and (2) refer to responsibility consistency, given that in the
binary choice responsibility was assigned favorably (1) or unfavorably (2). Rows
(3) and (4) display consistency for performance beliefs depending on the binary
performance belief elicitation.
If consistent, row (1) subjects should have a responsibility switchpoint above five
and thus assign more than 50% probability to the “favorable” event. Those around
the threshold are close to indifference (highlighted in dark gray), while those in light
gray choose clearly inconsistently. For instance, assigning only 30-40% probability to
the matched partner being responsible for a positive shock but before indicating to
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believe the partner is responsible — as is the case for the three participants highlighted
in row (1) in the fourth column — is not consistent. The table shows that a substantial
fraction of participants reports probabilities around the indifference threshold of 5 and
6, indicating that indifference could help to explain our difference in non-parametric
results between our binary and BDM responsibility measures.
Moreover, it seems that some subjects did not understand the BDM choice list.
Twelve participants strongly violate consistency when asked about responsibility,
and ten participants do so for the performance beliefs. In line with the notion of
misunderstanding, it takes these participants also clearly longer to make these BDM
choices. Those being inconsistent for the performance questions take on average 24
seconds longer (out of 90 seconds they have) for this BDM, while they are 2.5 seconds
faster than the consistent subjects for the binary performance belief (both comparisons
do not exceed a p-value of 0.037, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Directionally, the
same is true for the responsibility questions. Participants that are inconsistent spend
on average 3.5 seconds longer on answering the BDM version of the question, while
they are almost 5 seconds faster for the binary responsibility question.28 Hence, in the
following regression analysis, we exclude those participants that misunderstood the
elicitation procedure.
Table 4 reports results from regressions including the alternative measures of the
responsibility and performance beliefs. Again, adding performance beliefs as controls
is crucial since even same levels of responsibility attribution across group affiliations
in the BDM can imply reverse discrimination. This would be the case if Germans had
higher performance beliefs for other Germans than for refugees. The two-limit Tobit
specification of column (1) includes responsibility switchpoint as dependent variable and
the binary performance belief as control variable. We also control for the direction of
shocks. The coefficient for Refugee is positive as before but now insignificant (p =
0.393), as opposed to in Table 1. Hence, also when controlling for beliefs and shock
28When designing the experiment, we decided against including control questions to ensure
understanding of the BDM — as is often done for these complex elicitation procedures. We did not
want to treat refugees and Germans differently because that by itself could have induced a treatment
effect, and explaining the BDM in depth to the refugees would presumably have taken very long.
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Table 4: Favorable responsibility attribution with continuous
measures
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3)




Switchpoint cutoff 0.113*** 0.356***
(0.011) (0.090)




Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 140 142 131
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.197 0.064
Notes: Column (1) and (3) report two-limit Tobit regressions on responsibility switchpoint.
Column (1) includes the binary performance belief indicator belief high, whereas column (3)
includes performance switchpoint. Column (2) reports average marginal effects of from a
probit regression explaining favorable attribution with performance switchpoint. Subjects that
clearly misunderstood the BDM elicitations are dropped. All columns include additional
covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of experiments so far. Robust
and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance
on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
direction, we do not see a statistically significant positive effect of being matched with
a refugee on responsibility attribution implied by the BDM elicitation. Using the binary
responsibility measure and including non-binary performance beliefs in column (2),
however, results in similar findings as in Table 1. The effect of Refugee is significantly
positive. With both switchpoint variables instead of their binary counterparts in
column (3), we again observe no significant reverse discrimination.
How can we explain the insignificant coefficients for the specifications using
responsibility switchpoint? First, even when excluding inconsistent subjects, we still
expect some misunderstanding in the BDM. Especially the BDM for responsibility
attribution is rather difficult to grasp. This increases noise in the data and makes
detecting the effect more difficult.
Second, indifference or only weak binary preferences are important. These weak
inconsistencies, however, are still highly asymmetric. If only indifferent subjects were
responsible for the different results of Table 1 and Table 4, a substantial fraction
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of Germans matched with a refugee would have to be indifferent and attribute
favorably in the binary elicitation, while those in German and indifferent would
attribute unfavorably. This still is a clear form of reverse discrimination — it would
only be less costly than if it was not driven by indifference. Similarly, other types
of inconsistencies and choice reversals that we cannot categorize could drive the
difference in our findings. We do have some evidence for this type of strong
asymmetry in inconsistencies for the responsibility beliefs. Of the twelve participants
being strictly inconsistent (light grey in upper panel of Table 3), five are subjects
in German and all of these switch from unfavorable binary attribution to favorable
switchpoint attribution. In stark contrast to that, of the seven strictly inconsistent
Germans in Refugee, five switch from favorable binary attribution to unfavorable
probabilistic attribution. Despite the very low number of observations, this is a
significant difference (p = 0.028, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). The same is true for
weak inconsistencies. For this purpose, we define those with a switchpoint of 5 in
row (1) of Table 3 and a switchpoint of 6 in row (2) as being weakly inconsistent. In
German, 12 out of 19 inconsistent subjects change from unfavorable binary to favorable
switchpoint attribution, while only 9 out of 28 do so in Refugee. This difference is again
significant (p = 0.043, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided).
Third, with the BDM it might be more vague what the “right” thing to do
is. If reverse discrimination is driven by self-image and identity concerns, the BDM
elicitation procedure might well not make the identity prescriptions as clear as the
binary elicitation. For the binary responsibility attribution it is obvious what the
subjects should do if they do not want to blame someone. With probabilities this is
less clear.
In summary, we get directionally very similar results with the non-binary
belief elicitations. However, these results are weaker. Increased noise, indifference,
systematic inconsistencies, and possibly increased opagueness of the normative
prescription can help explaining this difference. While this provides some additional
insights into individual decision making, it does not change our main message: We
observe strongly asymmetric behavior leading to reverse discrimination and more
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favorable treatment of refugees.
Result 4: The evidence for reverse discrimination is weaker when considering non-binary
beliefs. The asymmetry in behavior explaining this difference, however, again points to strongly
group-specific patterns.
4 The KleeKandinsky Experiment
In an additional experiment, we only invited participants from the regular subject
pool and applied a minimal group paradigm to analyze whether our result of reverse
discrimination is a general result for in- and outgroups or whether it stems from
our specific groups in the Refugee Experiment. Since groups were formed based on
preferences for paintings of the artists Klee and Kandinsky, henceforth we call this
experiment KleeKandinsky Experiment (and our main experiment Refugee Experiment).
With a total of 142 subjects, we ran six sessions in August 2016. Subjects earned
e13.85 on average, including a e6 fixed payment for showing up on time. Each subject
participated in one session only.
Procedures differed only in dimensions explicitly catered to refugees mentioned
in Section 2. Hence, there was no gender restriction for participation, no Arabic
announcements were made, participants only drew seat numbers from one bag, and
group affiliation was communicated via group names (Klee or Kandinsky) instead of
first names. Moreover, every subject is matched with only one other subject. Subjects in
the Ingroup treatment (n = 72) are matched with a subject of the same group, while we
match subjects of different groups with each other in the Outgroup treatment (n = 70).
We employ a modified version of the minimal group paradigm used by Chen and
Li (2009). Subjects evaluate paintings of the artists Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky.
Five pairs of paintings containing each a painting of Klee and Kandinsky are shown.
For each pair and without knowing the artist of the paintings, participants have to
decide which of the two paintings they prefer. Based on a median split in artist
preferences, subjects are assigned to the Klee or Kandinsky group. This assignment































Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance for the
KleeKandinsky Experiment. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 6: Favorable attribution, rational attribution, and own performance in the KleeKandinsky
Experiment
Contrary to the results of the Refugee Experiment, responsibility attribution is not
affected by group affiliation of the matched partner in the KleeKandinsky Experiment.
Figure 6 shows that attribution is more favorable in the Outgroup treatment (light
gray bars), however, this can be explained by beliefs about performance. If anything,
given rational attribution (dark gray bars), subjects in Outgroup should attribute
responsibility even more favorably and subjects in Ingroup even less favorably. As can
be seen from the intermediate gray bars at the very right, the difference in performance
beliefs can be explained by differences in individual performances.29
Table 5 shows the same regression analysis as Table 1 does for the Refugee
Experiment. As we already observed in Figure 6, in the baseline regression in
column (1), it seems as if there is some form of reverse discrimination. This positive
effect of being matched with an outgroup member is not robust to controlling for
beliefs. The effect of group affiliation becomes a rather precise zero when we control
for performance beliefs (see column (2)). In column (3), we include a dummy
29Even though individual performances should be orthogonal to treatment assignment, we still see
pronounced differences. Participants in Outgroup solve 4.06 puzzles on average, while participants in
Ingroup only solve 3.36 puzzles on average. This difference is significant (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). Table C.3 in the Appendix reveals that the sample is balanced otherwise. There are
no differences with respect to age, number of semester, and number of experiments so far.
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Table 5: Favorable responsibility attribution (KleeKandinsky Experiment)
Dependent Variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outgroup 0.099** −0.006 0.023 0.010
(0.038) (0.057) (0.061) (0.056)
Belief high 0.392*** 0.336*** 0.345***
(0.079) (0.085) (0.077)
Neg shock 0.258*** 0.248***
(0.057) (0.056)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.141 0.206 0.224
Notes: Probit regressions on binary variable favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects.
Column (4) includes additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of
experiments so far. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
for the direction of the shock. As in the Refugee Experiment, we find that subjects
assign responsibility more favorably after negative shocks. Since shocks were evenly
distributed across group affiliation in the KleeKandinsky Experiment,30 we did not expect
to observe an effect on the Outgroup coefficient. This is confirmed by column (3).
Adding more controls in column (4) does not alter the results. Also note that effect
sizes of belief high and neg shock are quite similar to the ones from the Refugee Experiment.
Overall, this demonstrates that our finding of reverse discrimination is a result of our
natural group assignment in the Refugee Experiment and not a general result in our
experimental design.
Result 5: There is no evidence for reverse discrimination with artificially assigned groups.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several explanations for why we find reverse discrimination
in our setting. As we can rule out statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination
is a first natural candidate to look at. Subjects are willing to pay a price to attribute
responsibility favorably towards refugees. In our context, taste-based discrimination
3057% of subjects in Outgroup and 51% in Ingroup receive a positive income shock.
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would imply that this is the case because they have some sort of preference for this
group. This explanation seems, however, unlikely. First, participants matched with
refugees do not affect refugees’ payments by attribution behavior. Hence, outcome
based tastes cannot play a role for choices. Second, the same holds for tastes for
interaction. Participants never interact with their matched partner, and responsibility
attribution choices do not affect the degree of interaction. Third, the results of the IAT
reveal that Germans on average have negative implicit associations towards Arabic
names. Lastly, taste-based explanations also stand in stark contrast to the literature on
ingroup favoritism.31
The finding of favoring refugees might also be caused by the desire to be seen
as a good person by others. Social image concerns have been shown to be an
important motivation for decisions in various settings where behavior is publicly
observable (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009; Lacetera and Macis,
2010). In our setting, however, subjects take their decisions completely anonymously,
which is common knowledge to our subjects.32 Similarly, our experimental results
could be affected by experimenter demand effects (EDE), that is, in our case, by
norm conformity pressure. While we cannot completely rule out such effects, some
considerations render an interpretation of our results predominately based on this
pressure unlikely. Participants could indeed perceive favorable attribution towards
refugees as the appropriate behavior in the eyes of the experimenter. However, in
our between-subjects design, EDE should have also affected behavior of our subjects
in German and in the KleeKandinsky Experiment. This applies, in particular, to the
KleeKandinsky Experiment. The artificiality of the minimal group paradigm (as opposed
to a more natural identification based on first names) should, if anything, make EDE
even more likely (as implied by Zizzo, 2010). In these other treatments though,
beliefs about performance do not differ from favorable attribution. That is, behavior
is in line with rational responsibility attribution leaving the Refugee treatment as the
31See, e.g., the literature review by Hewstone et al. (2002).
32At the beginning of the experiment, we guarantee our subjects that all of their decisions will be
analyzed anonymously. The experimenter is not present in the laboratory while decisions are taken. In
addition, it is not possible to infer decisions directly from the level of payoffs (which is observed by the
research assistant privately handing out the earned money).
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only biased sample.33 Importantly, both social image concerns and norm conformity
pressure — if they occurred in our experiment — are likely to more strongly occur in
non-anonymous decision environments. Compared to actual behavior in the field, our
results would then provide a lower bound.
In addition to being motivated by appearing as a good person in front of others,
one could be motivated by appearing as a good person in front of oneself. Keeping
up a certain identity, a person’s self-view, oftentimes conflicts with profit maximizing
behavior and explains departures thereof in different economic spheres (e.g., Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000; Mazar et al., 2008). This can also lead to deliberately distorted
beliefs, i.e., motivated beliefs (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 2016; Grossman
and Van Der Weele, 2017). Agents with such motivated beliefs have a positive
willingness to pay for keeping up a specific self-image. We find that our subjects make
choices that are in line with behaving “politically correct”. Especially with regard to
our student subject pool, it seems to be plausible that being open and tolerant towards
minorities is part of our subjects’ identity. In order to keep up a positive self-view,
they seem to be reluctant to blame refugees. There is some evidence from psychology
supporting such reasoning. Dutton (1973) finds that middle-class Canadian whites
donate more when the solicitor is of black or Indian ethnicity as compared to when
the solicitor is white. With donors perceiving black people and Indians to be targets of
discrimination, the author interprets the results as supportive evidence for a specific
type of revealed reverse discrimination. In simple interactions, minority groups will
be treated better than other ingroup members. In addition, Byrd et al. (2015) show
that liberal and moderate whites favor black over white politicians in an artificial
setting. Participants read political speeches and saw a picture of either a black or a
white person who was supposed to have given the speech. Among other outcome
variables, more participants indicated that they would vote for a black politician. The
evidence of these studies suggests that actively avoiding explicit discrimination might
be part of the identity of politically liberal and moderate middle-class people to which
33At the end of the experiment, we further ask for non-incentivized verbal explanations for behavior.
We do not have a single statement that could be related to EDE.
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the majority of our subjects should belong to. This explanation is also in line with
the stronger results for the binary responsibility beliefs compared to the finer-graded
probability beliefs. In the former elicitation, it is absolutely clear what the “good” or
“bad” thing to do is. Hence, our subjects try to avoid taking the bad action towards
the refugees.34 In contrast, “good” and “bad” is not as clearly defined for the latter
elicitation procedure. We therefore argue that motivated belief formation is the most
plausible explanation for our main result.
6 Conclusion
We experimentally study responsibility attribution for negative and positive income
shocks. In particular, we ask whether there is asymmetric attribution of responsibility,
depending on whether a German participant is matched with another German or a
refugee. In our setting, there is imperfect information regarding the source of the
shock. It can either be due to a random draw or due to the performance of the
matched participant. This experimental paradigm is an abstract setting related to
several environments in the field. Oftentimes, there is uncertainty with regard to what
or who is responsible for a certain outcome. Group-specific behavior can thus strongly
impact the lives of different societal groups. Prominent examples relate to labor market
settings, where people that are discriminated against in responsibility attribution will
be strongly disadvantaged. This might occur in the hiring process or at later stages
in promotion, job assignment, or bonus decisions. Our study also relates on a more
aggregate level to how developments and outcomes for the society as a whole might
be related to groups of people. Recent examples are the strongly debated effects of
refugees on crime, economic prospects of societies, and cultural developments. The
negative shock of rising crime rates in some European countries might be indeed (in
part) caused by the influx of refugees (as suggested by Donald Trump’s quote at the
34We further assume that there is a clear difference in moral prescriptions between stating
performance beliefs and responsibility beliefs. While it should be perceived a good (bad) thing to
praise (blame) for responsibility, there should be no such moral connotation to stating mere performance
beliefs. This is why we expect to observe distorted (discriminating) responsibility attribution and rather
unbiased performance beliefs.
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beginning of this paper) but could also be due to many other factors.
Surprisingly and contrary to the literature, which predominantly documents
ingroup favoritism, we find no discrimination against refugees in responsibility
attribution. Importantly, refugees are clearly not blamed for negative events but less
often held responsible when a negative shock occurs. That is, we observe reverse
discrimination. German participants generally attribute responsibility to refugees
more favorably as compared to other Germans. We put forward an explanation based
on identity concerns and motivated beliefs. Participants want to view themselves
as non-xenophobic and tolerant and hence distort attribution as to not conflict with
this identity. This belief distortion consequently leads to reverse discrimination.
Comparing these results to an experiment with artificial group assignment, we show
that our results are not a general result for in- and outgroups but rather depend on our
specific sample. This lends support to the idea that the refugee sample indeed induces
identity concerns. Furthermore, implicit associations of our German participants
towards Arabic names are negative, while responsibility attribution is irrationally
favorable on average. This suggests that favoring refugees is a conscious choice in our
experiment. Moreover, we find that subjects with more positive associations towards
Arabic names attribute responsibility more favorably to them. Implicit associations —
which are correlated with important field behavior such as hiring decisions — thus
predict responsibility attribution in a meaningful way.
The evidence for reverse discrimination towards refugees together with our
results on potential mechanisms provide fruitful avenues for future research.
First, while we find strong evidence in the domain of responsibility attribution,
our study cannot draw conclusions about whether our finding for the natural
outgroup of refugees translates into other domains of discrimination such as trust
or social preferences. Second, our sample of university students (in Munich) is
not representative for the population (of Germany). This has implications for the
generalizability of our results. Similar studies with more right-wing and less liberal
subpopulations might yield different results. Hence, testing our findings with different
subject pools can yield additional insights — especially with regards to the effect of
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identity concerns. Future research could also exogenously vary identity concerns by
priming certain aspects of subjects’ identities. This could help to establish a causal link
between these concerns and discrimination behavior. Lastly, the difference between
our findings in the binary versus the probability-scale responsibility attribution
highlight a potentially mediating effect of moral prescriptions. Using a range of choice
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Appendix
A Refugee Recruiting Details
Refugees were recruited by distributing the leaflet shown in Figure A.1. The actual
first names of the refugees taking part in the experiment and which were visible to the
matched partner were: Abdo, Abduh, Abdullah (2x), Adnan, Ahmad (3x), Alaa, Ali,
Alkhder, Almhklf, Amjad, Anas, Bshr, Firas, Ghassan, Ghiath, Giwan, Hafez, Hasan,
Khaled (2x), Louay, Mazen (2x), Mohamad, Mohamd, Mohammad, Mohammed (3x),
Mounir, Nizar, Obaida, Odai, Omar, Sabri, Saleem, Schindar, Wissam, Yazan, Youssef.
Figure A.1: Leaflet for recruiting refugees (translated from Arabic)
The names of the German participants were: Aleksandar, Alex, Alexander (3x),
Aljoscha, Andi, Andreas (2x), Axel, Ben, Benedikt, Benjamin, Benno, Bernhard,
Caspar, Chris, Christian (3x), Christoph, Christopher, Daniel (4x), David (4x), Dominic,
Dominik (2x), Eric, Fabian (7x), Felix (3x), Fiete, Florian (2x), Franz, Franziskus,
Fridtjof, Gregor, Ion, Jan, Jan Fedor, Jens, Joel, Johannes (4x), Jonas (3x), Jonathan
i
(2x), Josaphat, Julian (3x), Kevin, Konstantin (2x), Korbinian (2x), Laurian, Lennart,
Leon, Leonard, Lion, Louis, Lukas (2x), Manuel, Marcus (3x), Marian, Marius (4x),
Markus (3x), Martin (2x), Matthias (5x), Maurus, Max (5x), Maximilian (3x), Michael
(4x), Moritz, Niclas, Niklas, Niko, Oswald, Pascal, Patrick, Paul, Philipp (4x), Raffael,
Richie, Roman, Sebastian (3x), Simon, Stefan (3x), Steffen, Stephan (2x), Thomas (3x),
Tilman, Tim, Timo, Tobi, Tobias (3x), Tom, Valentin, Vincent.
ii
B Puzzle Motives
The selected motives for the puzzles are pictures of a range of colors, a bird, a beach,
a lamb, a tree in a desert, a sunset over the ocean, a water drop, and a box of bananas.
They are displayed in Figure B.1.
Figure B.1: Puzzle motives for real effort task
iii
C Supplementary Results





































Notes: The figure shows favorable attribution and rational attribution for both treatments divided
by shock direction. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure C.1: Favorable attribution and rational attribution by shock direction
Figure C.1 shows actual attribution behavior and counterfactual rational attribution
based on performance beliefs for both group affiliations by shock direction. Even
though, at first glance, it looks as if behavior in Refugee after a negative shock drives
reverse discrimination, comparing behavior across the two group affiliation shows
that the difference in difference is rather similar for both shocks. After a negative
shock, participants in Refugees deviate by 0.288 from rational attribution, while those
in German attribute responsibility more favorably by 0.053. This is a difference in
difference of 0.235. After a positive shock, the deviation for participants in Refugees
is 0.095 and -0.088 in German. Hence, the difference in difference sums up to 0.183, and
is therefore close to 0.235 after a negative shock.
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C.2 Balance Table Cond vs. Uncond
Table C.1: Balance table Refugee Experiment (Cond vs. Uncond)
Cond Uncond (1) vs. (2)
(1) (2) p-value
Own performance 0.368 0.579 0.009
Age 22.474 23.303 0.160
Semester 4.224 4.553 0.534
Number of experiments so far 5.461 8.250 0.021
Notes: Own performance indicates whether a subject solved four or more puzzles.
C.3 Regression Analysis Controlling for Own Performance
Table C.2 reports results from regressions equivalent to our main regressions in Table 1
(Section 3.1) only using the number of correctly solved puzzles as control variable
instead of performance beliefs directly.
Table C.2: Favorable responsibility attribution (controlling for own
performance)
Dependent variable Favorable attribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee 0.160*** 0.181*** 0.144*** 0.139***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.047) (0.044)
# correct puzzles 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.091***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Neg shock 0.159** 0.148**
(0.063) (0.064)
Additional controls No No No Yes
Observations 152 152 152 152
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.062 0.081 0.090
Notes: Probit regressions on binary variable favorable attribution reporting average marginal effects.
Column (4) includes additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, semester, and number of
experiments so far (all insignificant). Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in
parentheses. Stars indicate significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.4 Balance Table for the KleeKandinsky Experiment
Table C.3: Balance table KleeKandinsky Experiment
Ingroup Outgroup (1) vs. (2)
(1) (2) p-value
Own performance 0.514 0.686 0.037
Age 24.875 24.729 0.842
Semester 5.736 5.129 0.220
Number of experiments so far 10.542 11.700 0.401
Notes: Own performance indicates whether a subject solved four or more puzzles.
vi
D Interaction Effect of IAT Score and Being Matched
with a Refugee
For estimating the interaction effect between having a negative IAT score and our
treatment, we compute predictive values for favorable attribution by using probit
regression estimates from model (3) used in Table 2 for the following four groups:
• Subjects in Refugee with a negative IAT score:
P(Y = 1|Re f ugee = 1, IAT < 0, X)
∧
= 0.5862
• Subjects in Refugee with a positive IAT score:
(Y = 1|Re f ugee = 1, IAT > 0, X) = 0.8375
• Subjects in German with a negative IAT score:
P(Y = 1|Re f ugee = 0, IAT < 0, X)
∧
= 0.5295
• Subjects in German with a positive IAT score:
P(Y = 1|Re f ugee = 0, IAT > 0, X) = 0.4189
This leaves us with a difference in differences of –0.3619 ([0.5862 – 0.8375] – [0.5295 –
0.4189]). Thus, the effect of having a negative IAT score on favorable attribution is 36.19
percentage points lower in Refugee than in German.
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E Instructions
The following passages are the instructions for Cond translated from German. Text in
italics refers to instructions read out aloud by the experimenter (alternating one of the
two authors), which were repeated in Arabic. Text in brackets indicates self-explaining
comments. Text in normal letters refers to instruction that the subjects read on screen
(either in German or Arabic).
[upon arrival at the laboratory]
Hello everybody. We provide refugees with the possibility to take part in a series of experiments.
This is why there are refugees among the participants today. In order to assign you to the seat
with the correct language [experimenter points at the two bags labeled with “German”
or “Arabic”] Arabic-speaking participants draw a card with a seat number from the bag with
the label Arabic and German-speaking participants a card from the bag with the label German.
[in the laboratory after seating took place]
Welcome to MELESSA. Thank you very much for showing up to this experiment on time. My
name is Felix Klimm/Stefan Grimm, and I will conduct this experiment today.
Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment.
For the sake of simplicity, you find the instructions on your screen. The instructions are the
same for all participants. Please follow the instructions. If you have any questions, please raise




This experiment is meant to study economic decision making. It will last about 1 hour.
You can earn money during the experiment. This money will be paid to you in private
after the experiment. You will make decisions in this study. These decisions will
affect your payment. In addition, your payment might depend on other participant’s
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decisions as well as on chance. Further rules will be explained to you right before each
decision. Hence, today’s payment is the sum of money earned with your decisions
plus e6 for showing up on time.
[new screen]
General Procedures II
The experiment consists of 2 parts. You will see the instructions for each part
right before the respective part starts. Data from this experiment will be analyzed
anonymously. At the end of the experiment, you will have to sign a receipt. This is
only for accounting purposes.
[new screen]
Part 1
In part 1 of the experiment, you need to perform a task. You receive e3 for performing
this task. Your task is to correctly solve as many puzzles as possible. This task is suited
for everybody as puzzles are well known in most parts of the world. For this purpose,
there are 8 puzzles next to your keyboard. You are allowed to start as soon as we tell
you to do so. After 10 minutes, you need to stop, and we will count the number of
correct puzzles. There will be a clock on your screen displaying the remaining time.
Click on OK if you understand the procedure. Please still wait with solving a puzzle
until we tell you to start.
[Subjects perform real effort and the experimenter and student research assistants
checks the number of correctly solved puzzles.]
[new screen]
Part 2
You are now matched with another participant. Please enter your first name for this
purpose. Thereafter, the first name of your matched participant will be shown to you.
Your matched participant will see your first name.
Your first name: ≪own name≫
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[new screen]
Your matched participant is: ≪name partner≫
[new screen]
Your payoff might depend on your matched participant’s decisions. Reminder: Your
matched participant is ≪name partner≫. In the following, you can receive additional
e5 or lose e5. Whether you are receiving or losing e5 depends on chance or the other
participant. First, the computer will determine via a virtual coin flip whether chance
or the other participant is responsible for your payment. Both cases are equally likely
(50/50). Hence, there are 2 possibilities:
1. If chance is responsible, you will receive e5 with 50% probability. Hence, a coin will
be flipped again.
2. If ≪name partner≫ is responsible, the number of puzzles that ≪name partner≫
solved correctly in part 1 will determine whether you receive or lose e5. If ≪name
partner≫ solved at least 4 puzzles, you will receive e5. If ≪name partner≫ solved
fewer than 4 puzzles, you will lose e5.











You will know about your payment in a second. However, you will not know whether
chance or ≪name partner≫ is responsible for this payment.




1. If ≪name partner≫ solved at least 4 puzzles, will you receive e5 in any case?
2. If ≪name partner≫ solved 3 or fewer puzzles and chance was selected to be
responsible for your payment, how likely is it that you will receive e5?
3. If chance was selected to be relevant for your payment, does your payment depend
on the number of correctly solved puzzles by ≪name partner≫ in this case?
4. How much lower will your payment be if you lose e5 compared to the case in which
you receive e5?
[new screen]
You have answered all the questions correctly. On the next screen you will see whether
you receive or lose e5.
[new screen]
Your income:
Reminder: The computer randomly determined whether chance or ≪name partner≫
is relevant for your payment. According to these rules:
You receive/lose e5.
[new screen]
We now ask you to answer 4 questions. One of the questions will be randomly selected




Do you believe that chance or ≪name partner≫ was responsible for your payment?





You will now make a sequence of decisions. Each of the decisions contains 2 options
— A and B. Both options give you once more the chance to receive another e5.
One of the 9 rows will be randomly chosen for payment if question 2 will be payoff
relevant.
If you choose option A in one of the 9 rows, you will receive e5 if ≪name partner /
chance≫ [name of partner or chance displayed depending on the answer to Question
1 — name of the partner displayed if subject indicated that the partner is responsible]
was responsible for your payment.
If you choose option B, you will receive e5 with a certain probability. This probability
varies from 10 to 90 percent and is shown to you next to every decision.
If question 2 is payoff relevant, one of your 9 decisions will be implemented. The
computer will randomly select which decision will be implemented in this case.
Please consider now from which probability on (which row) you want to choose option
B. If you took your decision, click on OK.
Option A You receive e5 if ≪name partner / chance≫ [here, again, name of partner
or chance displayed depending on the answer to Question 1] was responsible for your
payment.
Option B You receive e5 with a probability of 10% ... 90%.
[new screen]
Question 3
Do you believe that ≪name partner≫ solved at least 4 puzzles? Hence, did he solve
4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 puzzles?




In question 4 — like in question 2 — you will make a sequence of decisions. Each of the
decisions contains 2 options — A and B. Both options give you the chance to receive
another e5.
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One of the 9 rows will be randomly chosen for payment if question 4 will be payoff
relevant.
If you choose option A in one of the 9 rows, you will receive e5 if ≪name partner≫
solved at least 4 puzzles.
If you choose option B, you will receive e5 with a certain probability. This probability
varies from 10 to 90 percent and is shown to you next to every decision.
If question 4 is payoff relevant, one of your 9 decisions will be implemented. The
computer will randomly select which decision will be implemented in this case.
Please consider now from which probability on (which row) you want to choose option
B. If you took your decision, click on OK.
Option A You receive e5 if ≪name partner≫ solved at least 4 puzzles.
Option B You receive e5 with a probability of 10% ... 90%.
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